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ABSTRACT
Central bankers and financial supervisors often have different goals. While monetary policymakers
want to ensure that there are always sufficient lending activities to maintain high and stable
economic growth, supervisors work to limit banks. lending capacities in order to prevent excessive
risk-taking. To avoid working at cross-purposes, central bankers need to adopt a policy strategy that
accounts for the impact of capital adequacy requirements. In this paper we derive an optimal
monetary policy that reinforces prudential capital requirements at the same time that it stabilizes
aggregate economic activity. We go on to show that policymakers at the Federal Reserve adjust
interest  rate  policy  in  a  way  that  would  neutralize  the  procyclical  impact  of  bank  capital
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1 Introduction
Central bankers know that ￿nancial intermediation is important for achieving macroeconomic
stability. Without a functioning banking system, an economy will grind to a halt. It is the
job of regulators and supervisors to ensure that the ￿nancial system functions smoothly. But
monetary policy and prudential supervisory policy can work at cross-purposes. An economic
slowdown can cause deterioration in the balance sheets of ￿nancial institutions. Seeing the
decline in the value of assets, supervisors will insist that banks should follow the regulation
and ensure that they have suﬃcient capital given their risk exposures. The limit on bank
lending set by capital adequacy requirements declines during recessions and increases during
booms. And as intermediation falls, the level of economic activity goes down with it. It
looks as if regulation deepens recessions. As the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2001) put, the capital regulation ￿has the potential to amplify business cycles.￿
Blum and Hellwig (1995) provided the ￿rst theoretical demonstration that capital require-
ments can exacerbate business-cycle ￿uctuations. In focusing on entirely on the behavior of
the banking system, the Blum and Hellwig model provides an important ￿rst step, but in the
end their analysis is incomplete. They do not consider the response of the central bank to
economic ￿uctuations. This assumption is critical for their result but certainly unrealistic.
What if central banks conduct monetary policy to explicitly account for the impact of cap-
ital requirements?1 Will the procyclical eﬀect of capital requirements remain? Is this the
optimal thing to do for central banks? To answer these questions, we derive an optimal mon-
etary policy rule with both static and dynamic models in which the potential procyclicality
of capital requirements is embedded.
Our conclusions are as follows: A country￿s monetary policymakers should react to the
state of their banking system￿s balance sheet. And when they do, the procyclical eﬀect
of prudential capital regulation can be counteracted and completely neutralized. For a
given level of economic activity and in￿ation, the optimal policy reaction dictates setting
interest rates lower the more ￿nancial stress there is in the banking system when the economic
activity is in the downturn. We present simulation results to give a sense of the magnitude
of the required reaction. But when taking this proposition to the data and estimating
forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions for the United States, Germany (pre-
1In an economy with bank capital requirements, a policy game between bank regulators and central banks
can emerge. In this paper, we assume that monetary policymakers have more advantage in making the
movement in the game with bank regulators. This is based on the observation that the monetary policy is
usually conducted on the daily basis, while the bank regulation is altered slowly.
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uni￿cation) and Japan, we ￿nd that while monetary policymakers in the U.S. behave as the
theory suggests, lowering interest rates by more in downturns in which the banking system is
under stress, by contrast, central bankers in Germany and Japan do not.
We derive optimal interest rate rules with the static model and the dynamic model in
Section 2 and 3, respectively. Section 4 reports the simulation results and Section 5 discusses
the empirical estimation. Section 6 concludes.
2A S t a t i c M o d e l
2.1 The model
We begin with a static aggregate demand-aggregate supply model modi￿ed to include a bank-
ing sector. The purpose of this simple model is to highlight the impact of introducing bank
capital requirements in their most stripped down in order to show the extent to which the
banking industry can aﬀect business cycles. The static model also sheds lights on the fruitful
approach that solves the dynamic model.
The starting point is an aggregate demand curve that admits the possibility of banks
having an impact on the level of economic activity. Following Bernanke and Blinder (1988)
we distinguish between policy-controlled interest rate and lending rates and write aggregate
demand as:
yd = yd(i − πe,ρ − πe,π)+η, (1)
where i is short-term nominal interest rate, ρ is nominal loan rate, πe is expected in￿ation,
π is in￿ation rate, and η is a white noise random variable. We will refer to η as the aggregate
demand shock, since in equilibrium it will tend to move output and in￿a t i o ni nt h es a m e
direction. As wewill seeina moment, while thelending rateρ is determined by the equilibrium
in the lending market, the short-term rate i is set by the monetary authority, and so can be
treated as a constant. For future reference we note that we will make the standard assumption
that aggregate demand falls when any of the three arguments in equation (1) rises. That is,
both higher in￿ation and higher real interest rates result in lower level of aggregate demand.
Turning to the loan market, banks receive deposits and make loans. We have two cases.
When the capital requirement is not binding, we write real loan supply when the bank has
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suﬃcient capital and is not constrained, Ls
u,a s
Ls
u = B +(1− θ)D, (2)
where B is real bank capital, D is the level of real deposits and θ is reserve requirement.
When the capital requirement is binding2, banks￿ lending cannot reach the level indicated
in equation (2). Instead, loan supply is constrained to be a multiple of bank capital. That
is,
Ls
c = cB, (3)
where c is banks￿ statutory maximum leverage ratio and can be thought of as a measure of
￿nancial stress. In equilibrium, loan supply will be the minimum of Ls
u and Ls
c.
Next we need to model the relationship between bank deposits and bank capital on the
one hand, and macroeconomic variables like output, interest rates, and in￿a t i o no nt h eo t h e r .
We assume that the level of real bank deposits, D, depends on both the level of real output
and the real short-term interest rate. We write this as
D = D(y,i− πe), (4)
where the function is increasing in the ￿rst argument and decreasing in the second argument.
As for bank capital, it is assumed to rise and fall with aggregate economic activity. That is,
a rise in real output results in an increase in the value of bank assets. This could be because
of an increase in the value of tradable securities or because borrowers are now more able to
repay their debts. Using the established notation, this is
B = B(y), (5)
where the function is upward sloping.
To complete the story of banks and the loan market, we turn to the demand side. We
assume that real loan demand depends on the real loan rate and the level of real economic
activity, so
Ld = Ld(ρ − πe,y). (6)
The higher the real loan rate ρ the lower the loan demand, and the higher aggregate output
2We will refer to this in the paper as ￿banks are capital-constrained￿ or ￿the capital constraint binds.￿
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y the higher the loan demand.
We use a standard supply curve in which output depends positively on unanticipated
in￿ation plus an additive white-noise error. That is,
ys = ys(π − πe)+ , (7)
where a white noise random variable   is mean zero and uncorrelated with the aggregate
demand shock η.T h e s h o c k   is a common aggregate supply shock, as it pushes output and
in￿ation in opposite directions.
To determine the impact of capital requirements on aggregate ￿uctuations we need to
compute the impact of a shock on output both when banks are constrained by the capital
requirement and when they are not. This means solving two versions of a linearized version
o ft h em o d e l ,w h i c hw ew r i t ea s
yd = −yd
ρ(ρ − πe) − yd
i (i − πe) − yd
ππ + η,y d
ρ,yd
π,y d
i > 0, (8a)
D = Dyy − Di(i− πe),D y,D i > 0, (8b)
B = Byy, By > 0, (8c)
Ls =m i n [ Ls
u,L s
c]; where Ls
u = B +( 1− θ)D and Ls
c = cB, (8d)
Ld = −Lρ(ρ − πe)+Lyy, Lρ,L y > 0, (8e)
ys = β(π − πe)+ , β > 0, (8f)
ys = yd = y, (8g)
Ls = Ld, (8h)
where Xh denotes partial derivative of X with respect to h evaluated at the equilibrium for
the endogenous variables in the absence of shocks, which we normalize to be zero.
To solve this model, we ￿rst assume that agents have rational expectations, but are un-
aware of the shocks   and η. This means that they expect in￿ation and output to be zero.
That is, πe =0 . Next, using the loan and goods market equilibrium conditions we solve for
output and in￿ation in terms as functions of the two shocks and the nominal interest rate i.
We write the resulting two solutions in compact form as
π = −aj
πi − bj




π ≥ 0, (9a)
y = −aj
yi + bj




y ≥ 0, (9b)
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where the j superscript denotes whether the bank is constrained by the capital requirement,
j = c,o rn o t ,j = u.
Our interest is in the reaction of output to a shock and how this changes as the bank goes
from being unconstrained to being constrained by the capital requirment. Speci￿cally, the
goal is to ￿gure out whether bc
y ≶ bu
y and whether cc
y ≶ cu
y.
Taking derivatives with respect to shocks, we get two results: First, given a realization of
shocks, real output responds to shocks more when the banking system is constrained by the

































That is, the capital requirement increases the amplitude of business cycles if and only if bank
capital is suﬃciently responsive to the level of real output. Or put in another way, given loan
demand, the output sensitivity of the equilibrium loan rate (through loan supply side, so it
is negative) is larger in absolute value when the bank is capital-constrained than when the
bank is not.
Second, when the banking system is constrained, the response of output to a shock is
bigger the higher the ratio of bank lending to bank capital. That is, bc
y and cc
y are both



















This is all really by way of introduction, as we have done thus far is to establish that Blum
and Hellwig (1995)￿s result follows through to our setup. In the next step we add optimal
monetary policy to see what happens when interest rates are set with the knowledge that
bank behavior is constrained by the capital requirement.
2.2 Optimal monetary policy
We assume that the central bank is engaged in a stabilization policy. Monetary policymakers
adjust the short-term interest rate i in an eﬀort to reduce the variability of in￿ation and
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output. Formally, we take this to mean that the central bank solves a static optimization
problem in which it seeks to minimize a weighted squared loss of in￿ation gap and output
gap,
λπ2 +( 1− λ)y2, 0 < λ ≤ 1, (12)
subject to the structure of the economy speci￿ed above. Central banks assign both weights
λ on in￿ation stabilization and 1− λ on output stabilization, where output and in￿ation are
both expressed as deviations from their no-shock equilibrium levels (which are normalized to
zero).
We assume that policymakers are able to set their instrument with full knowledge of the
shocks that have hit the economy3. This means that they can adjust the current interest rate
i knowing the aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks η and  . Since they understand
what is happening in the banking system, they will respond diﬀerently depending on whether









where again c refers to the case in which banks are constrained by the capital requirement,




























,j = c or u. (14b)
While the sign of A
j
1 is always positive, the sign of A
j
2 can be either positive or negative,
depending on the ￿slope￿ of the ￿rst-order condition of (12) (that is the ratio of in￿ation and
output, −
(1−λ)β
λ ) and the slope of the aggregate demand of equation (8a) (while the loan rate








As is the normal case, monetary policy is capable of neutralizing aggregate demand shocks,
but supply shocks will create a trade-oﬀ between output and in￿ation variability. The
3Another way to say this is that all agents get information about the shocks but with noises. Central banks
can extract signals (the true shocks) perfectly from these information while private agents can￿t.
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important thing here is that the interest rate rule depends on whether the banking system is
constrained by the capital requirement or not. And, as we would expect, when the banking
system is constrained the interest rate reaction is larger. For an aggregate demand shock,









In response to a supply shock, whether the interest rate response is larger depends on












Next, we show that when the banking system is constrained, an increase in the ratio of
bank lending and bank capital implies a larger response of the interest rate to an aggregate





Finally, we substitute the optimal monetary policy rule into the solution for output and
in￿ation. That is, we substitute equations (13a) and (13b) into equations (9a) and (9b).
After simpli￿cation, we write the result as4
π = −
(1 − λ)β
λ +(1− λ)β2 , (18a)
y =
λ
λ+( 1− λ)β2 . (18b)
When monetary policymakers behave optimally, the aggregate output and in￿ation depend
only on the supply shock in a manner that is independent of the capital constraint. The
equilibrium of this stabilized economy depends only on two parameters λ (the weight on
in￿ation stabilization) and β (the slope of the short-term Phillips curve), regardless whether
4This result says that, as a consequence of conducting optimal monetary policy, the ratio of in￿ation and
output gap should be a constant (−
(1−λ)β
λ ), which sheds lights on the conjectured optimal policy while we
solve the dynamic model.
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λ+( 1− λ)β2. (19b)
In addition, the second cross-derivatives of output with respect to shocks and the leverage










3A D y n a m i c M o d e l
The results in the static context are important, as they establish the fragility of the earlier
Blum and Hellwig result. That is, by simply adding an optimal monetary policy to their
framework, we are able to show that capital constraints need not exacerbate business-cycle
￿uctuations. The next natural question is to see if these conclusions carry over to a dynamic
framework; one in which output and in￿ation deviations are persistent, and policymakers can
not aﬀect the economy immediately. To do this, we add a banking system to the model
originally examined by Svensson (1997, 1999). The result is a dynamic form of the model
written in equation (8) of the previous section:
yt+1 = αyyt − αi(it − πt+1|t) − αρ(ρt − πt+1|t)+ηt+1, 1 > αy > 0,αi,αρ > 0, (21a)
Dt = Dyyt − Di(it − πt+1|t),D y,D i > 0, (21b)
Bt = Byyt,B y > 0, (21c)
Ls
t =m i n [ Ls
t,u,L s
t,c]; where Ls
t,u = Bt +( 1− θ)Dt and Ls
t,c = cBt, (21d)
Ld
t = −Lρ(ρt − πt+1|t)+Lyyt,L ρ,L y > 0, (21e)




where all variables are de￿ned as before, except that now we write expected in￿ation as
πt+1|t, that is the expectation based on information available at time t. Note two additional
important adjustments to the model (We have omitted the equilibrium condition for the goods
market). First, the output gap in the aggregate demand equation (21a), yt+1, depends on the
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lagged output gap, as well as the real loan and policy-controlled interest rate. And second,
we write the aggregate supply equation (21f) with in￿ation on the left-hand-side, and it is a
function of previous in￿ation. As before, the loan rate ρt is determined in the loan market
depending on whether the banking system is constrained, and the central bank controls the
short-term interest rate it. Demand shocks and supply shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated
with each other and across time. Finally, when αρ equates zero and so lending is unimportant,
the system collapses into the Svensson model.
To solve the model, we compute the equilibrium loan rate using equations from (21b) to
(21e), holding the policy-controlled interest rate ￿xed. As before, there are two solutions that
depend on whether the capital constraint binds. Substituting these results into the aggregate
demand equation (21a) and using the aggregate supply equation (21f) to compute in￿ation




yyt + ηt+1, φ
j
i,φj
y > 0, (22)
where, as before, the superscript j equals either c when the capital constraint binds or u when
it doesn￿t. The coeﬃcients φ
j
i and φj
y are complex functions of the model parameters as
de￿ned in the Appendix. When the short-term interest rate is constant, this economy can
display the same behavior as the static model. As in Blum and Hellwig (1995), the impact of
shocks upon output can be ampli￿ed by a capital-constrained banking system if bank capital
is suﬃciently responsive to the level of real output. We present the details in the Appendix.
The next step is to introduce a central bank engaged in a stabilization policy. Following
the derivation in the static model, we introduce a policymaker￿s objective function and then
derive an optimal monetary policy rule. In the dynamic context, this means that the central
bank chooses a path for the interest rate {it+k}∞
k=0 in order to minimize a forward-looking










t+k +( 1− λ)y2
t+k], 0 < λ ≤ 1,0 < δ < 1, (23)
subject to the structure of the economy speci￿ed from equation (21a) to equation (21g); where
δ is a discount factor and, following our previous convention, output and in￿ation are written
as deviations from their no-shock equilibrium values. Since the in￿ation and the output gap
at period t have been given when policymakers choose the interest rate at that period, the
objective function in equation (23) includes squared losses starting from period t +1 .
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To facilitate analytical derivations, we assume Di =0so that the capital constraint binds
(does not bind) if and only if the output gap is negative (positive). This assumption is not
costly in terms of alleviating the impact of the capital constraint.
Solving the resulting stochastic dynamic optimization problem, we can derive optimal
interest rate rule as a linear function of in￿ation and the output gap:
i∗
c,t = Aππt + Ac
yyt, (24a)
i∗
u,t = Aππt + Au
yyt, (24b)
where the A￿s are complex functions of the parameters of the model as de￿ned in the Appen-
dix. We note that the stability condition that Aπ > 1 always holds whenever the structural
parameters of the model meet the conditions we have imposed.
We can derive the impact multipliers for the dynamic model. The results are analogous to
those in the static model. Following a shock, the interest rate reaction depends on whether
the banking system is constrained. If it is, monetary policy becomes more aggressive. That



















Finally, by substituting the optimal interest rate into equation (22) and using equation
(21f), we can write the output gap as a function of previous shocks,




βyηt−1 +  t−1
1 − ϕ(βy,δ,λ)L
], (27)
where L is a lag operator, and
ϕ(βy,δ,λ)=
1 − λ
1 − λ + β2
yδl
< 1.
The current output gap is the sum of all previous shocks weighted by a constant factor less
than unity. The output process becomes stable and mean-reverting. More importantly, when
10Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy
monetary policymakers behave optimally, the output gap depends on shocks in a manner that
is independent of the capital requirements.
4S i m u l a t i o n
The theoretical exercise yields an important analytical result: Optimal monetary policy will
move interest rates by more when the banking system is capital constrained making the out-
put gap invariant to the level at which the capital requirement is set. To help understand if
this analytical result is quantitatively important, we now turn to a simple simulation exercise.
Speci￿cally, we compare two policy regimes. The ￿rst, labeled regime I, assumes the policy-
maker behaves optimally following the rule i∗
c,t in (24a) when banks are capital-constrained
at period t and policy rule i∗
u,t in (24b) when banks are not. We compare this to a policy
regime, labeled regime II, in which the policymaker ignores the fact that the banking system




In order to simulate the model, we need to make a number of decisions, which are summarized
in Table 1. First, we interpret the model as applying roughly to economic activity at an annual
frequency. With this in mind, we choose our parameter values (except those parameter values
related to the loan market) based on Jensen (2002). That is, the output persistence αy is
0.5; the real interest rate sensitivity of demand αi is 0.75; the sensitivity of in￿ation to the
output gap βy is 0.1; the weight on in￿ation stabilization λ is 0.8. We set the discount factor
δ to be 0.96 rather than 0.99 in Jensen (2002)5.
The diﬀerence between our benchmark (policy regime I) and alternative policy regime
II mainly is a result of the fact that bank capital and deposits are both output sensitive.
That is, the diﬀerence between the behaviors of output, in￿ation, and the optimal interest
rate in the two cases depends largely on By and Dy. In an attempt to get the rough scaling
correct, we set By and Dy to be 0.15 and 0.2, respectively. The rest of the parameters are
set primarily for illustration.
5Jensen wants to use a value closed to unity so that the deviation from natural-rate hypothesis is negligible,
while in our model this concern does not exist. So, we use a more conventional value.
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Table 1: Calibration of the Parameters
Eq. Left-hand-side Variables Parameters Values
21a Aggregate Demand (yt+1)
Output persistence (αy)0 . 5 0
Elasticity w.r.t. real policy-controlled rate (αi)0 . 7 5
Elasticity w.r.t. real loan rate (αρ)0 . 7 5
Standard deviation of demand shock (ση)1 . 0 0
21b Real Bank Deposit (Dt)
Elasticity w.r.t. output gap (Dy)0 . 2 0
Elasticity w.r.t. real policy-controlled rate (Di)0 . 0 0
21c Bank Capital (Bt)
Elasticity w.r.t. output gap (By)0 . 1 5
21d Unconstrained Loan Supply (Ls
t,u)
Reserve deposit ratio (θ)0 . 1 0
21d Constrained Loan Supply (Ls
t,c)
Leverage ratio (c)1 0 . 0 0
21e Loan Demand (Ld
t)
Elasticity w.r.t. real loan rate (Lρ)1 . 0 0
Elasticity w.r.t. output (Ly)0 . 0 0
21f Aggregate Supply (πt+1)
Elasticity of in￿ation w.r.t. real output (βy)0 . 1 0
Standard deviation of supply shock (σ )1 . 0 0
They are as follows: the leverage ratio c is set to 10 (recent leverage ratio of the U.S.
banking system); the reserve requirement ratio for bank deposits θ is set equal to 0.1; the
output sensitivity of loan demand Ly is set to zero (for simpli￿cation); the real loan rate
sensitivity of aggregate demand αρ equals 0.756 (the conventional value for αi); the real loan
6Our simulation tries to capture what happens when the banking system is under stress during an economic
downturn. Such situation does not occur frequently. However, when it does, we believe that the coeﬃcient
before the real loan rate should become signi￿cantly larger. To avoid exaggerating the impact of credit crunch
in downturns, we choose to let the value of the real loan rate sensitivity of aggregate demand be the conventional
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rate sensitivity of loan demand Lρ is normalized to be unity and the real policy-controlled
rate sensitivity of bank deposit Di is set to zero. Finally, the standard deviation of two
random shocks (ση and σ ) are each normalized to one. We note that we are careful to set
the parameters so that the condition needed for the Blum and Hellwig result holds.
4.2 Simulation Results
We start with a baseline experiment in which the central bank does not react to shocks at
all, instead keeping the policy-controlled rate constant. To give some sense of what these pa-
rameter settings mean, we compute that a one-standard-deviation purely transitory negative
shock to either aggregate demand or aggregate supply drives output down by ￿ve times as
much after four periods in the economy that is capital unconstrained.
4.2.1 Transitory supply shock
T u r n i n gt ot h ee x p e r i m e n t ,w e￿rst examine the impact of a one-standard-deviation purely
transitory aggregate supply shock. That is, we set  t =1for t =1 ,a n d0o t h e r w i s e .
Furthermore, we set the initial conditions so that the economy is capital-constrained at the
outset. Under regime II the central bank sets interest rates ignoring the capital constraint,
using equation (24b). Under regime I, the central bank takes account of the capital constraint
and uses the interest rate rule given by equation (24a), switching to equation (24b) whenever
the capital constraint no longer binds. The resulting paths for output, in￿ation, and the
interest rate are shown in Figure 1. As we would expect, the output and in￿ation ￿uctuations
are much larger under regime II when the policymakers ignore the banking system. But
under regime I, since interest rates are moved aggressively in response to the negative output
gap at the outset, they are less variable over the entire horizon of the simulation. The
standard deviation of interest rates under regime I and II are 0.36 and 0.82 over 100 periods,
respectively.
More speci￿cally, to oﬀset a transitory in￿ationary supply shock, policy-controlled interest
rate has torise in the initialperiod. Over the followingperiod, the fully-optimal policy (regime
I) moves the interest rate low (aggressive) enough to counteract the procyclical eﬀect of the
binding capital constraint so that the in￿ation gap and the output gap are set on the optimal
path.
value of the real policy-controlled interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand.
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The suboptimal policy (regime II) is conducted with the same intention as the policy
regime I but fails to account for the procyclical eﬀect of the capital constraint, therefore,
doesn￿t dampen the recession enough by setting the interest rate too high at period 2. In ￿gure
1, from period 1 to period 9, the banking system is constrained by capital and policymakers
keep conducting the suboptimal policy (regime II). However, starting from period 10, bank
capital constraints are not binding under policy regime II, while the constraint always binds
under policy regime I.F r o m p e r i o d 1 0 , t h e i n ￿ation gap and the output gap are set on the
optimal path. The suboptimal policy (regime II) generates signi￿cantly larger loss over the
entire horizon. Computing the loss over a horizon of 100 periods ￿ that is, we truncate the
in￿n i t e - h o r i z o no b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o ni ne q u a t i o n( 2 3 )￿w e￿nd that the optimal policy entails a
loss that is less than half the size (the simulated losses in regime I and regime II are 4.7 and
11.4, respectively).
4.2.2 Transitory demand shock
We examine the impact of a one-standard-deviation transitory aggregate demand shock with
the same parameter con￿guration and present the paths of the output gap, in￿ation and the
interest rate under diﬀerent policy regimes in Figure 2. That is, we set ηt = −1 for t =1 ,
and 0 otherwise. Again, the banking system is capital-constrained at the outset.
In the period that the demand shock arrives, bank capital constraint binds. Diﬀerent
policy regimes cause the output gap diﬀer in the following period. Namely, the optimal
policy moves the interest rate low enough so that the output gap and in￿a t i o nr e t u r nt o
their optimal paths, while suboptimal policy fails to set the output gap and in￿a t i o no nt h e i r
optimal paths until period 5.
In this model, the demand shock is largely (but not completely) oﬀset by the fully-optimal
policy. Computing the loss over 100 periods, we ￿nd that the simulated losses in regime I
and regime II are 0.24 and 0.52, respectively. The diﬀerence between two policy regimes is
signi￿cant.
As for the volatility of interest rates, the optimal interest rate is slightly variable than
the suboptimal interest rate, with standard deviations being 0.25 and 0.21 over 100 periods,
respectively. But the relatively high volatility of the interest rate under regime I purely
comes from the strong reaction in period 1. After period 1, the interest rate is less variable
under regime I.
14Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy
Figure 1: Output Gap, In￿ation Gap and Interest Rate with Diﬀerent Monetary Policies:
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Central banks account for the impact of capital requirements in policy regime I but do the opposite in policy
regime II.T h i s ￿gure plots output gaps, in￿ation and interest rates for both policy regimes following a
transitory supply shock given the con￿guration of parameter values in table 1.
15Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy
Figure 2: Output Gap, In￿ation Gap and Interest Rate with Diﬀerent Monetary Policies:




























1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31
interest rate_I interest rate_II
Central banks account for the impact of capital requirements in policy regime I but do the opposite in policy
regime II.T h i s ￿gure plots output gaps, in￿ation and interest rates for both policy regimes following a
transitory demand shock given the con￿guration of parameter values in table 1.
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5 What were Central Banks Doing?
The simulation gives us some sense of how monetary policymakers should account for capital
constraints. The next natural question is whether central banks in fact follow a strategy like
the one our model suggests. In other words, do banks￿ balance sheets and capital requirements
play a material role in central banks￿ decisions? In this section, we examine data to see what
central banks were actually doing. To characterize the actions of central banks, we adopt
the now standard framework of estimating policy reaction functions, or the Taylor rule, for
the central banks of three major countries in the world: US, Germany (pre-uni￿cation) and
Japan. In his original work, John Taylor (1993) characterized his now famous policy rule as
a description of the Federal Reserve behavior from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s.
That is, he suggested that what the FOMC actually did was to set the nominal federal funds
rates so that
it = r∗ + πt +0 .5(πt − π∗)+0 .5yt, (28)
where it is the nominal federal funds rate at period t, r∗ is the natural real interest rate
(Taylor set this to 2 percent), πt is current in￿ation, π∗ is the in￿ation target (Taylor set
this to 2 percent), and yt is the percentage deviation of actual output from a measure of
potential or trend output. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000) have proposed estimating
a forward-looking version of this interest-rate rule based on the view that policymakers are
forward-looking. That is, they derive a reaction function of the form
i∗
t = r∗ + π∗ + γπ[Etπt,k − π∗]+γyEtyt,q, (29)
where i∗
t is the target rate for the nominal short-term interest rate in period t, πt,k is the
in￿ation from period t to period t + k, yt,q is the output gap of period t + q, and Et(•) is the
expectation conditional on information at t. As a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for
the model to be well behaved, the coeﬃcient on in￿ation has to be larger than one (recall
Taylor￿s original rule-of-thumb was to set γπ equal to 1.5).
To see whether the central bank￿s response to the output gap depends on the state of
the banking system (as suggested by the theoretical models), we augment equation (29) with
certain measure of the stress in the banking system. We denote the bank stress in downturns
and upturns with sd
t and su
t , respectively. Our augmented version of equation (29) is
i∗




t−1.( 3 0 )
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We let sd
t−1 be the lagged deviation of the leverage ratio from its HP trend when the output
gap is negative, otherwise zero; su
t−1 be the lagged deviation of the leverage ratio from its HP
trend when the output gap is positive, otherwise zero7. To address the possible endogeneity
o ft h el e v e r a g er a t i o￿a n di t sr e s p o n s et ot h ei n t e r e s tr a t e￿w ee s t i m a t et h er e l a t i o n s h i pw i t h
ao n e - q u a r t e rl a g .
Based on equations (24a) and (24b), all other things equal, the policy-controlled interest
rate should be lower when the leverage ratio is above-the-trend in an downturn and higher
when the leverage ratio is above-the-trend in an upturn. So, if policymakers react to the
stress in the banking system optimally, we expect the coeﬃcient on sd
t−1,γd
s, to be negative
and the coeﬃcient on su
t−1, γu
s, to be positive.
The observed interest rate adjusts smoothly to this desired level according to the partial
adjustment equation
it = Ψ(L)it−1 +[1− Ψ(1)]i∗
t + υt, (31)
where Ψ(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L,a n dυt is an i.i.d. random variable that we
can think of as a monetary policy control error resulting from things like unanticipated shifts
in the demand for bank reserves. Equation (31) summarizes the view that policymakers
are responding smoothly to a combination of in￿ation and the output gap. The standard
procedure is to substitute equation (30) into equation (31) and estimate the resulting equation.
We estimate this model using the Generalized Method of Moments8 on quarterly data
with two lags in the interest rate adjustment equation ￿ Ψ(L) is a second-order polynomial,
assuming that expectation horizon for in￿ation is 4 quarters. In the table below, we reported
the results for two expectation horizons of output gap (0 and 4 quarters). The instrument set
for the estimation includes a constant, 3 lags of short-term interest rates, in￿ation, output
gaps, producer price in￿ation, M2 growth (for Germany is M3), the term spreads between the
long-term bond rate and short-term interest rate, and leverage ratios.
For the U.S., our sample runs from 1989 to 2000, coinciding roughly with the Greenspan
Fed era before the stock market crashed in 2000, but starting two years late to avoid the
changes in the banking regulation that occurred in the 1980s. For Germany, data begin in
7Ideally, we would like to include a measure that tracks only the banks that are under stress ￿ what might
be thought of as the marginal stress in the banking system. Our average leverage ratio is a proxy for this
marginal measure since high average measure implies that there have been a relatively large number of banks
with relatively high leverage ratios.
8Our estimation method relies on the assumption that all of the variables are stationary. We use the ADF
test to reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in the interest rate or in￿ation for the US, Germany
and Japan.
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1979 and end in 1989 to avoid the impact of the uni￿cation. And for Japan, we examine the
d a t af r o m1 9 7 9t o1 9 8 9t oa v o i dt h e￿nancial turmoil during the 1990s in Japan.
Turning to the data, for each country we use the overnight rate that is controlled by the
central bank to measure the policy interest rate; in￿ation is measured by the consumer price
index; the output gap is de￿ned as the deviation of GDP from its potential. The leverage
ratio is measured as total loans of the banking system divided by the sum of bank equity and
subordinated debts for the U.S., and total assets divided by bank capital plus reserves for
Germany and Japan. Details of the sources and construction are described in the Appendix.
Estimation also requires that we make assumptions about both the target in￿ation (π∗)
and the target natural real interest rate (r∗) . F o rt h eU . S . ,w ea s s u m et h e s eb o t ht ob e2
percent. For Germany, the in￿ation target is set at 2 percent, and the natural real interest
rate is determined in the estimation. And for Japan, the in￿ation target is set as an HP
￿ltered trend, and the natural real interest rate is estimated.
Before examining the estimation results, it is useful to take a brief look at the data on
the leverage ratio. The three panels of Figure 3 display data for each of the countries we
study over the sample period we examine. We note that a general downward trend in both
the German and Japanese data is likely related to changes in regulatory standards. For the
U.S., leverage rose dramatically beginning in 1999.
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Time period: US 1989q02 - 2000q04; Japan 1979q01 - 1989q04; Germany 1979q01 - 1989q04.
Data Source: US quarterly leverage ratio is the ratio of total loans (RCFD2122) and the sum of total equity
capital (RCFD3210) and subordinated debt (RCFD3200), all taken from call reports. The quarterly leverage
ratios of Germany and Japan are interpolated from annual data in the OECD banking data set, de￿ned as
the ratio of total assets and capital & reserves. The interpolation method for Germany and Japan is to ￿ta
local quadratic polynomial for each observation.
Shaded areas indicate the quarters that output gaps are negative.
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5.1 Estimates
Estimates of the various policymakers￿ reaction functions are summarized in the three panels
of Table 2. For each country we report estimates both with and without the leverage ratios
(lagged and multiplied by the dummy variable that is one when output is above or below
potential), and for two settings of the assumed expectation horizons for the output gap (q =0
and 4). The p - values of the tests of overidentifying restrictions for all speci￿cations validate
the moment conditions we use. And the R2￿s suggest that the models ￿t relatively well.
We summarize the overall result as follows. For the US, the estimated coeﬃcients on
the in￿ation gap are larger than unity, implying stability, and close to the original Taylor
benchmark of 1.5. The coeﬃcients on the output gap are close or larger than the benchmark
value of 0.5. Looking at the results for where the policymaker is assumed react to both
current and future output gap (q =0and 4), we ￿rst see that, while the signs of γd
s are
negative in both cases, the data do not support adding sd
t−1 to the policy rule. That is, the
FOMC did not react strongly to the state of banking system during economic downturns.
Although the standard error for γd
s is large, it is still helpful to get some ideas of the economic
magnitude of the response. In this case, a one-standard-deviation increase in the leverage
ratio equals 1.82 and that this is estimated to result in a 0.36 - percent cut in the federal
funds rate, all other things equal.
Next, we see that the signs of γu
s are positive and signi￿cant in both cases, the data do
support adding su
t−1 to the reaction rule. That is, the FOMC did raise federal funds rate
when the leverage ratio is high-than-trend9 during an upturn, all other things equal. The
point estimate of the coeﬃcient is large, implying that a one-standard-deviation rise in the
leverage ratio causes a 2.8-percent rise in the federal funds rate, all other things equal.
Turning to the German case, we start by noting that the coeﬃcients before in￿ation and
output gap are close to the original Taylor values. Turning to the banking system stress
variable, to the extent that the Bundesbank did react, it did so in a way that appears to have
made matters worse. The estimate of γd
s is signi￿cantly positive and the sign of γu
s is both
negative and signi￿cant. These coeﬃcients imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in
leverage ratio will raise call money rate by 5 percent in a downturn and lower it by 0.9 percent
in an upturn.
Our estimates for the Bank of Japan are reported in the bottom panel of the table.
9The high leverage ratio during an upturn could be the result of credit expansion due to loan demand rather
than bank capital deterioration, so we must interpret this result carefully.
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For most speci￿cations, the coeﬃcients on in￿ation and the output gap look a bit large.
Regardless of other settings, we ￿nd that the data do support adding sd
t−1 to the policy rule
but, as in the German case, the resulting coeﬃcient estimates are of the wrong sign. To get
some ideas of the economic magnitude of the response, we can compute that a one-standard-
deviation rise in the leverage ratio during a downturn equals 1.56 and that this causes a
2-percent rise in the call money rate, all other things equal. As for the coeﬃcient before
su
t−1, they are negative and insigni￿cant. Bank of Japan did not react to the stress in the
banking system in an upturn.
Taken together, the estimates of these policy reaction functions suggest that FOMC￿s
policy is most consistent with the model prediction, that is, to lower (raise) interest rate in
response to the stress in the banking system when the economy is in a downturn (an upturn).
By contrast, our results suggest that the policymakers in Germany and Japan raised their
overnight interest rates, relative to the baseline, during period when output was below trend
and their banks were under stress ￿ the opposite of what our model suggests is optimal.10
6 Conclusions
Changes in bank lending are an important determinant of economic ￿uctuations. Central
banks, in working to meet their stabilization goals, strive to ensure a suﬃcient supply of
loans. In their eﬀort to maintain a stable ￿nancial system, regulators can work against
this objective. Capital requirements are a clear example. By dictating that all banks must
maintain suﬃcient capital with respect to their risk exposures, capital requirements can limit
the lending capacity of the banking system. Although the need for avoiding working at
cross-purposes is recognized, it is not clear whether central banks have formulated an optimal
strategy, namely, taken into account the impact of the capital requirements.
10To check the robustness, we also use alternative measures of in￿ation, diﬀerent lags of interest rate ad-
justment, the last-week policy-controlled interest rate of the quarter, the original backward-looking Taylor rule
speci￿cation and diﬀerent interpolation method. The robustness analysis delivers the similar overall result.
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Table 2: The Reaction functions of the United States, Germany and Japan
Countries Horizon Constant In￿ation Output Bank Stress Adjustment J Goodness
output gap Gap Gap Downturn Upturn coeﬃcient test of Fit
q γπ γy γd
s γu
s Ψ Adj. R2
United 0 1.28 0.61*** 0.92*** 0.87 0.95
States (0.21) (0.09) (0.01)
1.88*** 1.10*** -0.20 1.41** 0.90*** 0.87 0.95
1989q2 (0.23) (0.29) (0.33) (0.53) (0.02)
- 4 1.13 0.51*** 0.94*** 0.91 0.95
2000q4 (0.30) (0.15) (0.01)
1.82** 1.31*** -0.16 1.87** 0.92*** 0.88 0.95
(0.35) (0.39) (0.48) (0.76) (0.02)
Germany 0 3.62*** 1.05 -0.02 0.84*** 0.94 0.93
(0.25) (0.13) (0.29) (0.03)
1979q1 3.04*** 1.23** 0.33 6.26*** -0.67*** 0.74*** 0.98 0.94
- (0.21) (0.11) (0.21) (1.41) (0.12) (0.04)
1989q4 4 3.02*** 0.93 0.47 0.87*** 0.94 0.94
(0.55) (0.14) (0.49) (0.03)
3.00*** 1.18* 0.40 6.65*** -0.66*** 0.73*** 0.98 0.94
(0.29) (0.10) (0.26) (1.62) (0.12) (0.04)
Japan 0 3.75** 1.75 1.82*** 0.83*** 0.95 0.86
(0.43) (0.67) (0.64) (0.04)
1979q1 4.22*** 1.40 1.31* 1.30*** -0.04 0.70*** 0.92 0.86
- (0.27) (0.47) (0.72) (0.37) (0.10) (0.14)
1989q4 4 3.94*** 1.75 1.19*** 0.86*** 0.94 0.86
(0.51) (0.90) (0.42) (0.05)
4.19*** 1.33 0.61 1.13** 0.09 0.75*** 0.87 0.85
(0.42) (0.65) (0.55) (0.44) (0.09) (0.14)
Estimates are by the Generalized Method of Moments, using the correction for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation of unknown form with a lag truncation parameter of 4. The instrument set includes a
constant, plus lags 1-3 of short-term interest rates, output gaps, in￿ation rates (CPI), changing rates of PPI
and term spreads, growth rates of M2 (M3 for Germany) and leverage ratios. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The sum of two adjustment coeﬃcients (2 lags of adjustment equation for interest
rate) is presented while the reported standard error is for the sum of two adjustment coeﬃcients. The null
hypothesis for the coeﬃcient before in￿ation is γπ =1 . The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate that the
estimations are signi￿cant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The numbers of observation for the US,
Germany and Japan are 39, 37 and 37, respectively.
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This paper does three things. First, we con￿rm the results ￿rst derived by Blum and Hell-
wig (1995) that in the presence of completely passive monetary policy, capital requirements are
procyclical. That is, when banks become capital constrained shocks to the economy generate
larger movements in output. Our second result is to establish that optimal monetary policy
will neutralize the procyclical impact of capital requirements. That is, the capital adequacy
regulation need not encumber monetary policymakers in their pursuit of their goal. Finally,
we present evidence suggesting that while the Federal Reserve has been reacting as our model
suggests the German and Japanese central banks clearly have not. Blum and Hellwig need
not be right in theory, but they may very well be right in practice.
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Appendix
A Procyclical Eﬀect of Capital Requirements in the Dynamic
Model
This appendix explains that capital requirements amplify shocks. First, according to equation
(21f), we write the conditional expectation of period - t +1in￿ation as a function of the
variables known at period t
πt+1|t = πt + βyyt. (A.1)
To see the impact of bank capital regulation on real output, as a ￿rst step, we put equa-
tion (A.1) into the loan market conditions (equation (21b) - equation (21e)) to solve for the









y are functions of model parameters and have accounted for the impact of
bank activities, and so diﬀer depending on whether j = c or j = u. That is,
φu
i = αi = φc
i, (A.3a)
φu









(1 − θ)Dy, (A.3b)
φc







Since the short-term interest rate is controlled by central banks, we ￿xi ta tz e r ot os e eh o w
the economy develops without an active monetary policy. With equation (A.2) and equation
(21f), using a lead operator, we write real output process as a second-order diﬀerence equation





y)yt−2 + ςt, (A.4)
where ςt = ηt − ηt−1 + αi t−1.
This second-order diﬀerence process is generally explosive since one eigenvalue is greater
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As a function of φj
y and φ
j
i, eigenvalues depend on the state of capital constraint (whether
j = c or j = u).
The dynamic multiplier of the output process is eventually dominated by a function of the
























and how this changes as banks go from being unconstrained to constrained (from j = u to





will become greater as k →∞since the output follows an

















as k →∞ . If By > 1−θ
c−1Dy,






















grows faster when banks are capital-constrained if
By > 1−θ
c−1Dy. This is to say that the impacts of current shocks on output are ampli￿ed by
capital requirements under the same condition as the static model.
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B Solution for the Dynamic Model
This appendix explains how to solve the dynamic model. The solution has four steps: (1)
write down Bellman functional equations; (2) conjecture the optimal interest rate policy; (3)
￿nd the value function associated with the conjectured policy; and (4) verify that the value
function in step (3) satis￿es the Bellman equations in step (1).
B.1 Bellman Equations





{E[λ(π + βyy +  )2 +( 1− λ)(φu
yy − αi(i − π)+η)2]
+δEv(π + βyy +  ,φu
yy − αi(i − π)+η)}





{E[λ(π + βyy +  )2 +( 1− λ)(φc
yy − αi(i − π)+η)2]
+δEv(π + βyy +  ,φc
yy − αi(i − π)+η)}
if y<0. (B.10b)
T h et i m es u b s c r i p t sa r eo m i t t e ds i n c et h et i m eh o r i z o ni si n ￿nite. The condition y>0 (y<0)
indicates that the capital constraint is not binding (binding) at the period of decision-making.
The superscript u(or c) of φu
y(or φc
y) (de￿n e di ne q u a t i o n( A . 2 ) )d e n o t e st h a tt h ec o e ﬃcient is
associated with the slack (or binding) constraint. Starting from the period that policymakers
choose i, the output gap next period is given by φj
yy −αi(i−π)+η as in equation (A.2) and
the in￿ation next period is π + βyy +  .
B.2 Conjectured Interest Rate Policy and Associated Value Function
To solve the Bellman equation, instead of beginning with an initial guess v0 and iterating until
the process converges, it is more fruitful to conjecture the optimal policy directly, calculate
the value function w associated with the conjectured policy, and then verify that w satis￿es
the functional equations (B.10a) and (B.10b).
The sequence of events is as follows: Suppose period t is the period that policymakers
start to solve the dynamic problem so that they can ￿nd the optimal interest rate. Before
the beginning of period t, πt−1 and yt−1 have been given and interest rates are set to be a
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constant. At the beginning of period t,s h o c k s t or ηt arrive and thereby the values of πt
and yt are determined. Next, policymakers choose interest rate it before the end of period
t. Suppose the following conjectured policy is conducted in all periods t + k (k   0)s t a r t i n g
from period t:
φu
yy − αi(i − π)=b(π + βyy), if y   0, (B.11a)
φc
yy − αi(i − π)=b(π + βyy), if y<0. (B.11b)
The value function w associated with the conjectured policy is calculated in two steps.
The ￿rst step is to add discounted loss functions λπ2
t+k +( 1− λ)y2
t+k from period t +1to
in￿nite with the conjectured policy implemented, conditional on the information at period t.
Note that demand shock ηt+k and supply shock  t+k are uncorrelated with each other and
across time. This step yields a function ￿ w(π + βyy) as follows:
￿ w(π + βyy)=δ
λ+( 1− λ)b2














  denote the standard deviation of demand and supply shock, respectively. In the
derivation, the assumption δ(1+ bβy)2 < 1 is applied, which can be veri￿ed after b is solved.





1 − δ(1+ bβy)2 (B.13)
The ￿rst-order conditon with respect to b is
λ+( 1− λ)b2
1 − δ(1 + bβy)2 = −
(1 − λ)b
δβy(1 + bβy)




if λ =1 . (B.14b)








−2(1−λ)δβy ,i f λ  =1 ,
− 1
βy,i f λ =1 .
(B.15)
In the derivation from equation (B.14a) to equation (B.15), the positive root of b is excluded.
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According to equation (B.14a), the condition δ(1+bβy)2 < 1 ensures that the left-hand-side is
positive. On the right-hand-side of equation (B.14a), the sign of denominator depends on the
sign of 1+bβy, which is positive if in￿ation is persistent. It follows that b must be negative.
The value function associated with the conjectured optimal policy is obtained by replacing














2 if λ  =1 ,
δ









2(1−δ) if λ =1 .
(B.16)
It can be veri￿ed that w(π + βyy) satis￿es the Bellman equations (B.10a) and (B.10b).
The solution does not require to place structure on shock distributions. Consider a con-
tinuous case that the density of shock η is p(η),it is in general not easy to have an analytical
solution for the Bellman equation including the term Ev(η)=
’
v(η)p(η)dη. However, for
the capital-constraint case, the conjectured policy is linear and the associated value function
is quadratic. If the shock η follows a normal distribution, the expected value function includes
the ￿rst two moments of the distribution. The solution presented above works well.
In addition, it is easy to verify that the condition δ(1+bβy)2 < 1 holds since b in equation
(B.15) can be rewritten as
b = −
βyδl
1− λ + β2
yδl
.( B . 1 7 )










1 − λ + β2
yδl
= l, (B.18b)






















Equation (B.18a) follows from the de￿nition of b in equation (B.15) and l in equation (B.19).
Equation (B.18b) de￿nes l.
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Finally, according to equations (B.11a) and (B.11b), the optimal interest rate can be
written as











= Aππ + Aj
yyj = u,c, (B.20b)
where b and φj
y are de￿ned as above.
CD a t a
C.1 Converting Data Frequency
When we convert high frequency data into low frequency data, we use the average observation.
When interpolating low frequency to high frequency data (the leverage ratios of Germany and
Japan), we ￿t a local quadratic polynomial for each observation of the low frequency series,
then use this polynomial to ￿ll in all observations of the high frequency series associated with
the period. The quadratic polynomial is formed by taking sets of three adjacent points from
t h es o u r c es e r i e sa n d￿tting a quadratic so that the average of the high frequency points
matches to the low frequency data actually observed. For most points, one point before and
one point after the period currently being interpolated are used to provide the three points.
For end points, the two periods are both taken from the one side where data is available.
C.2 Data Sources
1. US short-term interest rate: quarterly average of weekly eﬀective federal funds rate
from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
2. US consumer price index: quarterly average of monthly data from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
3. US potential real gross domestic product: quarterly data from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
4. US real gross domestic product: quarterly data from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
5. Total assets of US banks: RCFD2170 in Call Reports available at
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http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/index.cfm.
6. Total loans of US banks: RCFD2122 in Call Reports available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/index.cfm.
7. Total equity of US banks: RCFD3210 in Call Reports available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/index.cfm.
8. Subordinated debt of US banks: RCFD3200 in Call Reports available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/index.cfm.
9. US money supply (M2) growth: quarterly average of annualized growth of monthly
data from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
10. US long-term bonds interest rate: quarterly average of monthly 10-year Treasury
rate from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
11. US producer price index: quarterly average of monthly data
from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
12. Germany short-term interest rate: quarterly average of monthly call money rate from
International Financial Statistics.
13. Germany consumer price index: quarterly average of monthly data from Interna-
tional Financial Statistics.
14. Germany potential real gross domestic product: quarterly data from Economic Out-
look 73 as published by the OECD.
15. Germany real gross domestic product: quarterly data from Deutsche Bundesbank.
16. Total assets of banks, Germany: OECD bank database. The annual data are inter-
polated into quarterly data using the conversion method discussed above.
17. Total equity of banks, Germany: OECD bank database. The annual data are in-
terpolated into quarterly data using the conversion method discussed above.
18. Germany money supply (M3) growth: quarterly average of annualized growth of
monthly data from International Financial Statistics.
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19. Germany long-term bonds interest rate: quarterly average of monthly government
bond rate from International Financial Statistics.
20. Germany producer price index: quarterly average of monthly data from International
Financial Statistics.
21. Japan short-term interest rate: quarterly average of monthly call money rate from
International Financial Statistics.
22. Japan consumer price index: quarterly average of monthly data from International
Financial Statistics.
23. Japan potential real gross domestic product: quarterly data from Economic Outlook
73 as published by the OECD.
24. Japan real gross domestic product: quarterly data from Economic Planning Agency.
25. Total assets of banks, Japan: OECD bank database. The annual data are interpo-
lated into quarterly data using the conversion method discussed above.
26. Total equity of banks, Japan: OECD bank database. The annual data are interpo-
lated into quarterly data using the conversion method discussed above.
27. Japan money supply (M2) growth: quarterly average of annualized growth of monthly
data from International Financial Statistics.
28. Japan long-term bonds interest rate: quarterly average of monthly government bond
rate from International Financial Statistics.
29. Japan producer price index: quarterly average of monthly data from International
Financial Statistics.
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